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Illiberal Media and Popular Constitution Making in Turkey 
 
1. Introduction  
Popular constitution making, a process that allows for public participation as opposed to a 
handful of elites writing a fundamental social contract behind closed doors and imposing 
it on the rest of society, is tricky. It sounds like a noble idea in theory, but it is difficult to 
execute effectively, efficiently, and, most importantly, democratically. Even trickier are 
the roles of publicity and media in popular constitution making. What are the 
consequences of reporting during the drafting of a new constitution? In what ways could 
the media lend legitimacy to the process by informing the public and incorporating public 
opinion into the drafting of a constitution? Coupled with the rise of new media 
technologies, an ideal of participatory constitution making (and an active role for the 
media) may seem desirable, not to mention attainable, but there are myriad ways to 
participate, and basing a constitution on popular opinion could easily devolve into a 
majority of 50 percent plus one that imposes its will on the rest. The bare minimum, 
ideally, is to expect journalists to report on facts without bowing to political or economic 
pressures, but even that is easier said than done. For which audiences are these 
journalistic facts intended? For those leaders drafting the new constitution or the public at 
large? 
 These are not easy questions to answer empirically, not only because media and 
communications are often neglected in studies of constitution making, but also because 
the relationship between the two is hard to ascertain precisely. Popular constitution 
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making relies on the principle that the legitimacy of constitutions reflects the process by 
which they are drafted as much as their content. The media are expected to play a 
weighty and presumably unbiased role in linking and amplifying what happens during the 
process. But when some of the oldest and most resilient constitutions around the world 
were drafted, journalism was stridently partisan, and not at all an objective, even-handed 
intermediary.1 The specific role of media in more contemporary examples of (popular) 
constitution making also varies significantly depending on the context in question.2   
In liberal democracies, or those that aspire to become liberal-democratic, the 
media are expected to report without bias, keep the public informed, and put pressure on 
decision makers.3 In more autocratic regimes, the media usually function to signal the 
 
1Sociologist Michael Schudson documents that during the ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution in l787–88, Federalists not only controlled the press, but also forced the 
papers that strove to report views on both sides to end their coverage. See Michael 
Schudson, “The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,” Journalism 2, no. 2 (2001): 
149–70.  
2Nicole Stremlau, “Media, Participation and Constitution-Making in Ethiopia,” Journal 
of African Law 58, no. 2 (2014): 231–49. 
3Michael Schudson, “How to Think Normatively about News and Democracy,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Communication, ed. Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), available at 
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political power of elites to citizens while shaping the underlying belief structures and 
values of the public.4 Normative theories aside, in any political system, the media 
constitute a semi-autonomous institution whose positioning vis-à-vis the political and 
economic fields, not to mention their own internal dynamics, shape the news.5 On the one 
hand, the state tries to constrain the voices and viewpoints presented in the media by 
providing official narratives, regulating speech, and controlling the political economy of 
the news industry. On the other hand, commercial pressure shapes and limits the range of 
content and views in the media considerably.6 There are also historically established 
journalistic norms and practices that determine the autonomy of the profession and 
diversity of public narratives in a given country (e.g., the professionalization of 
 
www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.001.0001/oxfordhb
-9780199793471-e-73 (accessed March 8, 2019).  
4Haifeng Huang, “Propaganda as Signaling,” Comparative Politics 47, no. 4 (2015): 419–
44. 
5Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (Cambridge: Polity, 1993). 
6Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994).  
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journalism, public service orientation in reporting, limited interference from the state, and 
legal protections of speech, to name a few).7 
What can we then learn about the media’s role in popular constitution making 
from Turkey’s 2011–2013 process? For one, this case demonstrates, yet again, how 
messy and complicated the role of media is in the process of democratization, especially 
when it comes to collectively agreeing upon the fundamental principles of a nationwide 
contract such as a constitution. Turkey has always been a so-called hybrid regime, one 
that combines democratic and authoritarian elements,8 but the regime of the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) represents a particular epoch in 
which political leaders not only have deliberately manipulated democratic institutions for 
their own gains, but also attempted to “create [their] own tutelage over democratic 
politics.”9 Even though Turkey’s media system was far from perfect prior to the AKP’s 
tenure, the consolidation of an illiberal media environment—one that purportedly has a 
plurality of news sources and viewpoints, but is also intimately tied to the government 
 
7Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
8Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 
(2002): 21–35. 
9Ertuğ Tombuş, “Reluctant Democratization: The Case of Justice and Development Party 
in Turkey,” Constellations 20, no. 2 (2013): 312–27, 314.  
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and restricted to binary narratives—distinguishes this era. The period from 2011 to 2013 
substantiated, over and over again, the AKP’s tight control over media and its overall 
autocratic inclinations. If the attempt at popular constitution making evidences an 
anomaly in what is otherwise a traditional case of constitutional imposition, as Petersen 
and Yanaşmayan suggest in this volume, the Turkish press mediated this anomaly against 
the background of a rapidly degenerating media system.10 
Turkey’s rare attempt to create an inclusive, participatory, consensus-driven 
political process with an illiberal media calls into question some of the taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the relationship between democracy and media, such as that 
transparency is key to democratic decision making, that diversity of viewpoints leads to 
better public debates, and that participatory processes are essentially more democratic. 
Rather than fundamentally challenging the significance of these principles (transparency, 
diversity, and participation), Turkey’s experience serves as a reminder that autocrats can 
easily appropriate democratic discourses and practices for their own ends, and the media 
are not powerful enough to be a bulwark against creeping authoritarianism. 
Based on a combination of newspaper content analysis and institutional history, I 
identify three distinct phases in the 2011–2013 period when journalists in Turkey, already 
quite limited in their capacity to report news, tried to cover this ambitious democratic 
experiment and its failure. First, in the early days of the Constitutional Conciliation 
 
10See Petersen and Yanaşmayan, Ch. 1 in this volume. 
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Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK), the AUK’s tight control over the 
public narrative seems to have taken on an undemocratic tone (especially in contrast to 
their stated commitment to an inclusive procedure), yet it resulted in a mostly neutral 
coverage that regularly emphasized the values of a democratic process. Second, when the 
AUK began to negotiate over how to draft the new constitution, the weakening of press 
control led to ostensibly more independent coverage of the new constitution, albeit in a 
way that simplified and polarized the debate over contested topics instead of inviting a 
multi-perspectival dialogue. Finally, as the AUK’s work was derailed by failing to reach 
an agreement on key topics, the significance of which was the shift to a presidential 
system, the press coverage seemed to revert back to what it had already learned to do 
well in general, that is, to bifurcate the narrative as pro- or anti-AKP, or more precisely, 
as pro- or anti- the political leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.11  
In the following, I first present a brief overview of how the AKP government has 
established a new media environment by suppressing liberal-critical voices, fortifying its 
own media bloc, and pushing its own narratives to shape the news agenda. Then I discuss 
how the AUK intended to break out of the polarized and repressed news cycles by 
instituting control over reporting on the new constitution. Finally, I examine how the 
 
11For a detailed discussion of the issues surrounding AKP’s presidentialism proposal in 
this volume, see Petersen and Yanaşmayan, Ch. 1; Böcü and Petersen, Ch. 5; and Özsoy 
Boyunsuz, Ch. 7.   
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press coverage less inhibited by the AUK ended up promoting simpler and more divisive 
narratives. Toward the end of the constitution-making process, the highly polarized, 
illiberal media amplified the impasse the commission was already experiencing, and 
reduced the whole process to a debate over the AKP’s proposal for a presidential system.  
 
2. The Making of Illiberal Media in Turkey 
Government pressure over media, self-censorship among journalists, tight alignment with 
state ideology, and political instrumentalization of the press have a long history in 
Turkey. During the AKP’s single-party rule, however, not only have press–state relations, 
media ownership structures, and journalistic cultures transformed in myriad ways, but 
also the shift in political ideologies (from secular-nationalist to Islamist-nationalist) has 
challenged the existing rules and norms in the profession.12 In this section, I first present a 
brief history of the media environment in Turkey prior to the AKP era, and then detail 
how the AKP government constructed a new, illiberal media system over the last fifteen 
years or so.  
 
2.1 Turkey’s Media System prior to 2002  
 
12Ozan Aşık, “Politics, Power, and Performativity in the Newsroom: An Ethnography of 
Television Journalism in Turkey,” Media, Culture & Society (2018), available at 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718799400 (accessed March 29, 2019).  
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The active participation of Turkey’s journalists in political life dates back to the late 
nineteenth century.13 Such political engagement either resulted in highly intimate 
relations between the press and the government, or was repeatedly quashed if it was 
deemed too critical. Starting with the single-party years of the republican period (1923–
45), many journalists joined the ranks of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP).14 Cumhuriyet, for example, now a left-of-center newspaper, was 
founded soon after the republic was established under the auspices of the CHP and 
Atatürk. Journalists who were close to the party propagated the modernizing reforms of 
the regime in their newspapers. Some news outlets and journalists were critical of the 
government, especially during the attempts to form a multi-party regime in the years 
before 1945, but a critical press was either shut down or quite limited by the laws 
regulating political opposition. 
 The post-1945 multi-party regime, especially the era of the Democratic Party 
(Demokrat Parti, DP), offered “both the carrot and the stick” to the press.15 On the one 
hand, a new Press Law was instituted in 1950 to recognize the freedom of the press and 
 
13Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, “The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in 
Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 2 (1996): 109–23. 
14Ibid. 
15Raşit Kaya and Barış Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey,” Turkish 
Studies 11, no. 4 (2010): 521–37. 
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journalists’ right to unionize. On the other hand, authoritarian clauses were added to 
enable the government to shut down publications and impose prison terms on 
journalists.16 Party officials continued establishing clientelistic relationships with media 
owners and individual journalists. The DP government also transformed public radio into 
a political apparatus that was used both to spread party propaganda and to silence 
critics.17   
Immediately after the 1960 coup d’état brought down the DP government, the 
military seized power over the press. Yunus Emre and Burak Cop report that the mass 
media played a critical role during the 1961 constitutional referendum. In order to 
increase voter turnout and encourage massive support for the new constitution, the press 
regularly covered declarations of “yes” votes.18 In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey’s mass 
media started moving more toward television broadcasting, as the Turkish Radio and 
Broadcasting Corporation (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu, TRT) quickly expanded 
across the country. Especially in the 1970s, every new government tried to seize control 
 
16Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey.” 
17Cihat Göktepe, “1960 ‘Revolution’ in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey,” 
The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 30 (2000): 140–89. 
18Yunus Emre and Burak Cop, “The 1961 Constitutional Referendum in Turkey,” 
Sociology of Islam 3 (2015): 49–75. 
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of TRT, and, eventually, the next coup in 1980 brought TRT under the control of the 
military.19 
Turkey’s media system has traditionally been identified as a “polarized pluralistic 
model,” a category that also includes countries such as France, Greece, Spain, Italy, and 
Portugal. Polarized pluralist media systems, in general, tend to have limited newspaper 
circulation, politicized media organizations (with links to political parties or with clear 
political leanings), and an under-professionalized journalistic workforce.20 The post-coup 
liberalization of Turkey’s economy in the 1980s enabled a range of new commercial 
actors to emerge (especially in broadcast),21 but journalism has been consistently 
 
19Esra Elmas and Dilek Kurban, “The Case of Turkey,” in Media Policies and Regulatory 
Practices in a Selected Set of European Countries, the EU and the Council of Europe 
(European Commission Report, 2010), 412–444, available at www.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/BIR.pdf (accessed March 4, 2019). 
20Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems; Esra Elmas and Dilek Kurban,  
“Communicating Democracy–Democratizing Communication: Media in Turkey: 
Legislation, Policies, Actors”, in TESEV Democratization Program Media Studies Series 
–1 (2011) available at  www.fes-
tuerkei.org/media/pdf/Publikationen%20Archiv/Ortak%20Yay%C4%B1nlar/2011/2011
%20Communicating%20Democracy.pdf (accessed March 8, 2019). 
21Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey.” 
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influenced by political parties22 and aligned with dominant state narratives.23 As Ozan 
Aşık observes, “[T]he secularist consensus … served as the primary entity defining what 
should be perceived as the public interest and common good” in the press up until the 
early 2000s.24 Despite a proliferation of publications with various political orientations in 
the 1990s, Turkey’s mainstream media remained closely aligned with state ideology, a 
fact most significantly reflected in the coverage of Kurdish issues and the conflict with 
the Kurdistan's Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) since 1983. Not only 
was the word “Kurdish” tacitly banned in the mainstream media until the 1990s, but 
many journalists who failed to follow this rule faced legal repercussions.25 Even though 
 
22Salih Bayram, “Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press, a Historical Interpretation,” 
Turkish Studies 11, no. 4 (2010): 579–611. 
23Bilge Yeşil, “Press Censorship in Turkey: Networks of State Power, Commercial 
Pressures and Self-Censorship,” Communication, Culture and Critique 7, no. 2 (2014): 
154–73. 
24Ozan Aşık, “The Fall of the Public and the Moral Contestation in the Journalistic 
Culture of Turkey,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 10, (2017): 69–
85.  
25Esra Ercan Bilgiç, Vatan, Millet, Reyting: Televizyon Haberlerinde Milliyetçilik. 
(İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2008); Faik Bulut, Türk Basınında Kürtler (İstanbul: 
Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2010.)  
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the AKP’s early years seemed to have increased the visibility of Kurds in the media via 
the government’s official recognition of Kurdishness as a distinct identity and the 
opening of a Kurdish-language television channel, the AKP government has continued 
cracking down on Kurdish cultural and political expression throughout its tenure.  
 
2.2 The AKP Era (2002 onwards) 
After the liberalization wave in the industry, particularly in the 1990s, Turkey’s 
mainstream media became overwhelmed by a combination of clientelism—in which 
media owners relied on state resources to become competitive in non-media fields—and a 
corporatist structure—in which companies needed to cater to multiple audiences.26 This 
existing system enabled the AKP government to tame the media landscape and even 
create its own AKP-friendly media bloc (sometimes referred to as yandaş 
[partisan/advocate] media). Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, for example, argue 
that the AKP government controls what they call “media autocracy” through neoliberal 
 
26Christian Christensen, “Breaking the News: Concentration of Ownership, the Fall of 
Unions and Government Legislation in Turkey,” Global Media and Communication 3, 
no. 2 (2007): 179–99; Ali Çarkoglu, Lemi Baruh, and Kerem Yildirim, “Press-Party 
Parallelism and Polarization of News Media during an Election Campaign: The Case of 
the 2011 Turkish Elections,” International Journal of Press/Politics 19, no. 3 (2014): 
295–317. 
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measures such as conglomerate pressure, judicial suppression, online banishment, 
surveillance defamation, and accreditation discrimination.27 Bilge Yeşil suggests that the 
AKP exploited this historical and structural continuity in media–government 
relationships to cultivate the neoliberal authoritarian state of present-day Turkey.28  
The AKP’s early tenure, which overlapped with the aftermath of the 2001 
economic crisis in the country, focused on realigning the extant corporatist–clientelist 
media environment with the interests of the party.29 A couple of years after Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan came to power, some of the bankrupt media companies were taken over by the 
Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, TMSF), a regulatory 
body under the prime minister’s office. Existing media moguls—the Doğan Group, for 
example—jumped on this opportunity to acquire new outlets, thereby strengthening their 
dominance in the industry. It was not unusual for the TMSF, however, to take over a 
media company only to hand it over to an AKP-friendly bidder. In 2007, the Ciner 
Group, which included the popular newspapers Sabah and Takvim and one of the most 
 
27Murat Akser and Banu Baybars-Hawks, “Media and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a 
Model of Neoliberal Media Autocracy,” Middle East Journal of Culture and 
Communication 5, no. 3 (2012): 302–21. 
28Bilge Yeşil, Media in New Turkey: The Origins of an Authoritarian Neoliberal State 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016).  
29Çarkoglu et al, “Press-Party Parallelism and Polarization”; Yeşil, Media in New Turkey. 
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popular national TV channels, ATV, was sold to the sole bidder, Turkuvaz Media, owned 
by the Çalık Group, which was then run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak.30 There 
were brand new players, such as the Çalık, İpek-Koza, and Sancak groups, which entered 
the field of media to cozy up to the government. They were not shy about it, either—
Sancak Holding’s CEO, Ethem Sancak, openly admitted that it was his support for the 
AKP that led him into the media industry.31  
The confiscation and sale of financially challenged companies to pro-AKP 
enterprises in the 2004–2008 period were not the only steps toward the making of a pro-
AKP media environment.32 The incestuous ties between media companies and political 
elites were further solidified via public procurement contracts. Large holding companies 
with interests in construction, energy, transportation, finance, and tourism regarded media 
properties as “a levy that must be paid to ensure continued access to government 
 
30Nina Ognianova, Jean-Paul Marthoz, Robert Mahoney, Joel Simon, Özgür Öğret, Şafak 
Timur, and Nebahat Kübra Akalın, Turkey’s Press Freedom Crisis: The Dark Days of 
Jailing Journalists and Criminalizing Dissent (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012), 
available at https://cpj.org/reports/Turkey2012.English.pdf (accessed March 8, 2019). 
31Yeşil, Media in New Turkey. 
32Ibid.  
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contracts.”33 In order to continue benefitting from government bids and favors, media 
owners repeatedly interfered in editorial decisions and restricted criticism of the AKP 
government in the late 2000s.34 In addition to these political-economic interventions, the 
early tenure of the AKP government also ushered in the appointment of new managers, 
editors, and pundits with clear pro-AKP views, despite the fact that most of them had no 
prior background in journalism.35 It is important to note that all of these changes took 
place alongside the strengthening of a tightly networked group of media outlets following 
the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who at that time had a political-economic alliance 
with the AKP. 
 
33Susan Corke, Andrew Finkel, David J. Kramer, Carla Anne Robbins, and Nate 
Schenkkan, “Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey,” Freedom 
House Special Report (2014), available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf 
(accessed March 8, 2019). 
34Burcu Baykurt, “The Gezi Protests Have Shown the Rampant Institutional Bias in 
Turkey’s Media which Now Leaves Little Room for Facts,” LSE Europp Blog, (July 10, 
2013), available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/07/10/gezi-protest-media 
(accessed March 8, 2019). 
35Yeşil, Media in New Turkey. 
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Media independence was further curtailed with the prosecution of several 
journalists under the Anti-Terror Law, part of two major political investigations known as 
Ergenekon (2007), a reference to an alleged shadow organization plotting against the 
government, and Balyoz (“Sledgehammer”) (2010), after the code-name of a purported 
coup plot, 36 Some journalists, accused of “collaborating with the Ergenekon 
organization,” were imprisoned even without trial. In addition to the chilling effect this 
had on reporters and media managers when it came to criticizing the AKP, the 
government’s regular wiretapping and raiding of news organizations undermined the 
privacy of reporters and discredited their professional standing in society.37 The use of the 
Anti-Terror Law to prosecute journalists was not limited to the cases of Ergenekon and 
Balyoz. Since 2009 dozens of journalists and editors from the Kurdish media have been 
arrested on the grounds of membership in the Kurdistan Communities Union (Kürdistan 
Topluluklar Birliği, KCK), thereby routinely criminalizing reporting on Kurdish rights 
and criticism of the Turkish military.38  
In 2009 the AKP government struck an obvious blow against a critical media 
giant in the form of an exorbitant tax fine. After the Doğan Group’s flagship newspapers 
Hürriyet and Milliyet covered a German court case in which several Turkish citizens with 
 
36Yeşil, “Press Censorship in Turkey.” 
37Yeşil, Media in New Turkey. 
38Ibid.  
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ties to the AKP leadership were accused of misappropriating tens of millions of dollars 
from Deniz Feneri, a Turkish charity, Erdoğan first called for a boycott of the media 
company. The Doğan Group was then hit with a $500 million tax fine, which was 
followed by an additional $2.5 billion fine a few months later. The combined tax levy 
nearly equalled the company’s total assets, thereby posing an existential threat to its 
survival. The Doğan Group immediately appealed the charges, while also taking 
measures to appease then-Prime Minister Erdoğan. The chairman of the company, Aydin 
Doğan, stepped down, followed by the resignation of Ertuğrul Özkök, the editor-in-chief 
of its flagship daily newspaper Hürriyet.39 In 2010 and 2011, the company sacked some 
of the critical columnists from the mainstream papers Hürriyet and Radikal, and 
eventually sold two other newspapers, Milliyet and Vatan, to a holding company with 
strong ties to the government.40  
Following the AKP’s election victory in 2011, the intimate relationship between 
media owners and the government, which depended on complicity, censorship, and 
outright control, became so obvious that it simply could not be denied. As Yeşil 
evocatively notes, loyal businessmen who have entered the media industry since 2004 
“were not simply motivated by prospects of receiving favors from the government, but 
 
39David O’Byrne, “Turkish Media Mogul Resigns,” Financial Times (December 31, 
2009), 16. 
40Corke et al, “Democracy in Crisis”; Yeşil, Media in New Turkey. 
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they were also ‘doing favors for the government.’”41 Frequent defamation claims by 
politicians against journalists, along with increasing self-censorship or censorship by 
editors due to fears of repercussions, put major pressure on media coverage. A new wave 
of resignations and dismissals of critical voices from the mainstream media continued 
through 2011. Journalist Banu Güven, for example, was fired by the Doğuş-owned NTV 
in 2011 for her criticism of the AKP’s stance on the Kurdish issue.42 Following his 
dismissal from NTV in 2011, veteran journalist Can Dündar proclaimed the “dawn of a 
new era in Turkey’s media field” that was marked by a “widespread purge, a cleanup.”43 
According to Turkey-based Bianet (Independent Communications Network), 104 
journalists were in jail in 2011.44 By way of contrast, according to the Committee to 
 
41Yeşil, Media in New Turkey, 106.  
42Ayse Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, New Capitalism in Turkey: The Relationship 
between Politics, Religion and Business (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014).  
43Yeşil, “Press Censorship in Turkey.” 
44Emel Gülcan, “Press Freedom Day with 95 Journalists Behind Bars!” BIA Media 
Monitoring- News Center (July 25, 2012), available at https://bianet.org/english/freedom-
of-expression/139915-press-freedom-day-with-95-journalists-behind-bars (accessed 
March 8, 2019). 
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Protect Journalists, only 27 reporters were in jail at the end of 1998.45 Reporters without 
Borders (RSF) ranked Turkey 148th out of 179 countries on its World Press Freedom 
Index, and cited 2011 as the year of “unprecedented arrests, massive phone taps … and 
escalating judicial harassment of journalists,” all of which had created “a climate of 
intimidation in the media.”46 That was a significant drop from the country’s ranking of 
99th in 2002, the year RSF first published its index and the AKP came to power. As of 
2018, Turkey had plummeted even further, ranking 157th in the World Press Freedom 
Index.47 
 
45“Turkey: Criminal Prosecutions of Journalists,” Committee to Protect Journalists 
(1999), available at https://cpj.org/reports/1999/05/turkeyreport.php (accessed March 8, 
2019). 
46Reporters Sans Frontiers, “World Press Freedom Index 2011/2012” (2012), available at 
https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-20112012 (accessed March 8, 2019). 
47According to the U.S-based Freedom House, Turkey’s freedom rating did not shift 
significantly from the 1990s to the late 2000s. For example, Freedom House ranked 
Turkey “partly free” in 1999 (before the AKP came to power) with a 4.5 freedom rating 
(on a scale of 1=best and 7=worst), whereas the country received an improved 3.0 rating 
in 2011 and was marked as “partly free” again. Turkey’s Freedom House ranking became 
significantly worse as of 2017, and the country was recognized as “not free” in 2018 with 
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In political journalism there is always a symbiotic relationship between journalists 
and politicians, but the terms and nature of this relationship vary across countries and 
time periods.48 Ozan Aşık suggests that what distinguishes the AKP-era media 
environment is a significant departure from this “interest-based” relationship, which has a 
long and asymmetrical history in Turkey, into one with “kinship-like ties and organic 
solidarity with the AKP.”49 Through political pressure, legal coercion, and economic 
incentives, the AKP has not only established several loyal media outlets, but also 
neutralized opposition media since the 2000s.50 As the country became more polarized 
and the AKP tightened its control over the media starting in 2011, journalists in Turkey 
 
a 5.5 rating. See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/turkey (accessed 
March 26, 2019). 
48Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, “The Production of Political Journalism: The Push and Pull of 
Power, Routines and Constraints,” in The Handbook of Communication Sciences – 
Political Communication, ed. Carsten Reinemann (New York: DeGruyter Mouton, 2014), 
305–24. 
49Aşık, “The Fall of the Public,” 81.  
50Bilge Yeşil, “Authoritarian Turn or Continuity? Governance of Media through Capture 
and Discipline in the AKP Era,” South European Society and Politics 23, no. 2 (2018): 
239–57.  
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began displaying strong allegiance to the AKP’s Islamist-nationalist narratives at the 
expense of fair and balanced reporting.51  
 
3. Publicity and Popular Constitution Making 
By mid-2011 the AKP had won a landslide victory in the general elections, but lacked the 
constitutional mandate to unilaterally draft a new constitution. All political parties had 
pledged to a new constitution that should be democratic as well as civilian, and 
committed to joining the AKP in the new parliament to write a new constitution. The 
media were to play a crucial role in this process of drafting a new constitution in an 
inclusive, pluralistic, and positive manner, which would mark a radical departure from 
the country’s already divided and AKP-dominated socio-cultural landscape. 
At the time, the AKP was enjoying hegemony over the mainstream media, and the 
existing political criticism in Turkey’s media environment was still orbiting around the 
narratives shaped by the party. As Ali Çarkoğlu and his colleagues demonstrate in the 
news coverage of the 2011 elections, opposition media failed to generate enough 
publicity for opposition political parties.52 In other words, news outlets critical of the 
AKP were not able to provide wide-ranging and effective alternative coverage of 
Turkey’s politics at the time. That is, of course, not entirely the media’s fault. As the 
 
51Aşık, “The Fall of the Public.”  
52Çarkoğlu et al., “Press-Party Parallelism and Polarization.” 
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authors rightly acknowledge, the inability of the critical press to spotlight a more 
compelling opposition narrative was also due to the fact that no single opposition party 
was able to mobilize enough popular support to emerge as a viable alternative to the 
AKP. Nonetheless, this particular snapshot illustrates how ill equipped Turkey’s critical 
media were in 2011 to cover such a complex and heated topic as the making of a new 
constitution. 
In the following three sections, I explain how the media coverage of constitution 
making shifted from tightly controlled, yet relatively balanced and informative to less 
restrained but more partisan. In particular, the year 2013, which overlapped with the Gezi 
protests, corruption allegations against the AKP, and the dissolution of the AUK, marked 
a watershed in the history of Turkey’s illiberal media. Not only did media control and 
censorship—and self-censorship—become undeniably visible post-2013, but they also 
took on outlandish proportions.  
 
3.1. The AUK and the Media (October 2011–May 2012)  
The AUK held its first meeting on October 19, 2011. The four political parties that were 
present in the Parliament at the time were each represented by three members, regardless 
of the seat distribution.  Cemil Çiçek, then AKP MP and the president of the Parliament, 
was to chair the process. The AUK’s decision-making process was based on the 
unanimity principle—a rare practice in a political system designed for majoritarianism. 
Çiçek echoed the value of seeking consensus on the opening day of the commission. “All 
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of us may have a different constitution in mind,” he said. “The tolerance and conciliation 
that a new constitution requires may help alleviate the cultural and political polarization 
that Turkey has long experienced.”53 Çiçek’s emphasis on the significance of how the 
new constitution would be drafted (e.g., seeking consensus, based on tolerance and 
conciliation) was a welcome change in a country that was speeding toward an 
increasingly authoritarian state order. It also invited scrutiny from various actors, 
including the media, in order to hold the AUK accountable to these positive promises. 
The AUK, however, began its tenure against the background of a new domestic 
crisis. A day before the first meeting, Kurdish militants clashed with the Turkish military, 
resulting in the killing of 24 soldiers.54 In response, on October 20, 2011, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan convened a meeting with top media owners and editors to discuss the coverage 
of the Kurdish issue. Asking media executives not to “serve the aims of terror by 
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knowingly or unknowingly propagandizing,”55 Erdoğan practically issued a “quasi gag 
order” on the coverage of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military.56 
Erdoğan’s message to the media might appear to be limited to this particular issue; 
however, his increased control over media, wrapped around a sensitive national security 
claim and an intimidating warning about “knowingly or unknowingly” spreading 
propaganda, had a chilling effect on editorial decisions beyond the issue of terror. In 
addition, it raised reasonable doubts about how sincere the AUK’s promise to draft a new 
constitution in an inclusive manner was in the context of an ongoing armed conflict and 
limited freedom of political expression in the media.  
Ahead of Erdoğan’s meeting with the press, the AUK was already concerned with 
the extent of publicity about the commission’s work. In their very first decision, the 
members unanimously decided that the media should not be privy to conversations inside 
the meetings. Calling on everyone, including the media, to act “responsibly” during this 
new process, Çiçek asked reporters not to write “background” stories about the closed 
meetings, and added that he would be talking to the editors-in-chief of major newspapers 
about that. “The public should be informed about a constitution drafted in the name of the 
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public,” Çiçek then acknowledged, but nonetheless reiterated his instruction that the 
media should only cover the official statements of the commission.57 Çiçek was adamant 
about the participation of regular citizens, along with members of civil society 
organizations, in the process. He just did not want the press to be mediating between the 
AUK and the public. Soon the AUK launched a website—www.yenianayasa.gov.tr—not 
only to showcase previous constitutional documents, examples from other countries, and 
press coverage, but also to facilitate citizen feedback. The AUK also expressed the 
intention to use the website to poll public opinion regarding some of the articles of the 
new constitution once they were drafted.58 
Next, in early November 2011, the AUK convened a meeting at Dolmabahçe 
Palace with managers and editors from a wide range of news organizations. Cemil Çiçek, 
along with some AUK members from each party, asked the media to “support the work 
of the commission, encourage public participation, and advise in case of a deadlock.”59 
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There were reportedly thirty-three newspapers (including minority papers), five news 
agencies, three magazines, two foreign newspapers, and thirty-one broadcast channels 
from a variety of political positions in the room. There were also, however, some notable 
omissions, such as the leftist pro-Kurdish publication Özgür Gündem, the Kurdish news 
sources Dicle Press Agency and Azadiya Welat, the Greek news source İho, and the 
Armenian outlet Marmara.60 
After these initial meetings, the AUK kicked off a consultative process that lasted 
from October 2011 to April 2012 to capture the wide range of concerns and 
recommendations regarding the new constitution. They announced a series of meetings 
with a variety of organizations, including universities, unions, political parties, think 
tanks, and provincial bar associations. Nearly 10,000 citizens reportedly sent their 
recommendations to the AUK.61 This rare process of listening to different interested 
parties by all members of the Parliament was perceived to be a positive step toward the 
making of a new constitution. Yet it was soon clouded by the AUK’s decision not to 
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publish the views and suggestions collected from different organizations. Dubbed the 
“secrecy rule” by some monitors of the process, the AUK members defended their 
decision on the basis of protecting these groups and preventing further conflict and 
polarization over the recommendations.62   
The assumption motivating the virtue of publicity in any political process is not 
only to hold powerful institutions accountable, but also to create a more effective, 
responsive, and democratic regulatory process. In the case of political decision-making, 
however, sunlight may not always be the best disinfectant, pace U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis. Jon Elster, for example, suggests that while public deliberations 
may help avoid “open logrolling or horsetrading” and encourage arguments in favor of 
the common good, they can also push decision makers to adopt “rigid, inflexible 
positions as a pre-commitment device,” since it is harder to walk back public statements 
than those expressed in closed meetings.63 In that sense, the AUK’s effort to set 
limitations on the media, dictate what was newsworthy, and operate in outright secrecy 
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seemed to be a genuine attempt to shield the commission from the potentially corrosive 
pressure of public opinion. The AUK tried to make up for this democratic deficit by using 
the website as a presumably open way to solicit citizen feedback. That was, however, a 
highly unsatisfactory substitute for transparency, as the AUK was still at the helm, 
deciding what went online or not about the consultations and moderating the online 
discussions. 
What did the news coverage look like when the AUK was tightly controlling the 
public narrative about the new constitution? A content analysis of newspaper reports 
from the period between October 19, 2011 and February 2012 shows that the coverage 
predominantly focused on Chairman Cemil Çiçek’s statements and the day-to-day work 
of the AUK.64 That is perhaps not surprising given the significance of a new constitution, 
the radical method of striving to draft it based on consensus and consultation with a wide 
range of organizations, and Çiçek’s own commitment to making sure that the media acted 
“responsibly” in this process. The coverage was not always sympathetic. The opposition 
media criticized the AUK’s decision to keep the meetings closed, with articles bearing 
titles such as “The Civilian Constitution is Behind Closed Doors” and “The 
Commission’s First Disagreement is about the Chairman” (both in Cumhuriyet) and 
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“What Would Happen if Obama Convened Media Representatives?” (in Habertürk).65 
Nonetheless, most papers followed the instructions of the AUK, and there was little 
coverage of the organizations and groups that provided recommendations.   
In hindsight, given Turkey’s polarized political environment at the time and the 
already existing pressure on mainstream media, the AUK’s aversion to full transparency 
makes sense. Even in more liberal democratic contexts, full transparency in government 
can sometimes do more harm than the democratic good it promises to deliver. More 
openness may expose decision-makers to powerful and potentially malevolent authorities 
or interest groups, thereby inhibiting honest deliberations.66 The glare of publicity may 
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make it difficult for decision makers to negotiate with each other in candid and creative 
ways, especially in political climates marked by drastic partisanship. David Stasavage 
offers a game-theoretic justification for limiting transparency, suggesting that open 
deliberation has the potential to lead to mass polarization instead of consensus.67 
Restricting the work of the media through open warnings, one-on-one meetings, and 
withholding internal documents may appear somewhat overbearing even for Turkey, 
where some of those practices had become rather normalized by that time. Nonetheless, 
the early coverage of the AUK seemed to be more measured and informative, especially 
in contrast to the coverage of the commission’s work in late 2012 and 2013. The limited 
autonomy of reporters resulted in relatively fewer and shorter stories about the new 
constitution, but the reports that were published gave the impression of a more consistent 
narrative across various media outlets. As the AUK professed a commitment to working 
with civil society organizations and soliciting citizen feedback, the mainstream media’s 
regular reporting on the historical significance of making a democratic constitution and 
detailed information about the process was just the kind of publicity that the commission 
needed at the time.   
 
3.2. The AUK Starts Drafting a New Constitution (June–December 2012) 
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The drafting of the new constitution began in May 2012. By June 2012 there was already 
not only more media coverage of the commission,68 but also a change in the way the 
media covered the AUK.69 While still driven by the work of the AUK and voices of the 
commission members (as opposed to civil society actors or minority voices), the media 
began to report on the progress of discussions in the commission. For example, the 
Gülen-affiliated Zaman newspaper, tightly aligned with the AKP government at the time, 
covered the AUK under the special rubric “Constitutional Diary.”70 In the beginning, the 
mainstream media remained loyal to the reporting conventions set out by the AUK, even 
when initial disagreements inside the commission flared up. Still reporting on the basis of 
the official statements put out by the AUK members, newspapers highlighted the content 
of debates rather than polarizing narratives, thereby providing “more neutral, informative, 
and even positive views.”71  
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In July 2012, for example, the commission took a break from regular meetings 
due to a deadlock over two issues—the right to education in one’s mother tongue and 
inclusion of sexual orientation in the text of the article on equality, both of which were 
proposed by the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP). The 
ideological orientations of newspapers shaped the headlines; nonetheless, all papers gave 
voice to political parties in equal measure in their stories. Zaman, for example, reported 
the impasse in an article titled “BDP Presses the Brake on Constitutional Drafting,”72 but 
despite blaming the BDP for stalling the commission’s work in the title, the story then 
extensively and soberly covered the BDP’s complaint that the party’s considerations were 
not taken into account during internal discussions. It also covered Cemil Çiçek’s and 
other commission members’ responses, along with updating the readers about the overall 
progress of the commission. Cumhuriyet, which is highly critical of AKP, broke the same 
news under the headline “A Break on the Crisis of Mother Tongue,”73 and led the story 
with a quote from BDP’s Hasip Kaplan: “We will reveal who gets in the way of the 
process, but it will never be us who obstructs the process,” thereby demonstrating that 
BDP’s critical stance in the commission did not intend to hinder the process. Similar to 
Zaman’s story, Cumhuriyet’s version highlighted the critical voices on the commission, 
such as members of the CHP and BDP, as well as Cemil Çiçek. Despite the fact that the 
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commission postponed its deliberations for a few weeks, newspapers did not escalate the 
severity of the situation. “A Break on the New Constitution,” Akşam reported, and 
highlighted quotes from each party representative.74 “Mother Tongue Postponed in the 
Constitution,” the liberal paper Taraf announced, while dedicating the rest of the story to 
the clauses that the commission had completed drafting to that point.75  
This balanced and careful tone started shifting, however, as internal 
disagreements over specific articles continued into late 2012. At some point, reporters 
stopped following the AUK’s earlier instruction not to cover the closed meetings or 
provide background stories. Even in countries where there is more press freedom, the 
media usually “patrol the boundaries of culture and keep discord within conventional 
bounds,”76 and it is only when there is disagreement among elites that reporters deviate 
from dominant frames.77 The Turkish media were much less experienced in taking a 
proactive, critical role that goes beyond the official frame of any story. When the AUK 
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stopped presenting a united front, media coverage started splintering and rendering the 
public narrative in line with the various outlets’ ideological loyalties.78 In other words, 
pro-government and opposition media chose which of the AUK’s proceedings to cover 
on the basis of their political leanings, limited their sources to those who agreed with the 
views of the outlet, and framed the actual negotiations in a highly biased manner, again, 
in support of their political stance.79 
Take what happened in September 2012, when the commission weathered another 
predicament over constitutional secularism, which secures freedom of religious 
expression and conscience.80 Cumhuriyet chose to cover this debate with the exaggerated 
headline “Open Door for Sharia,” and narrowed the overall discussion to the issue of 
state secularism, that is, the principle that a state does not govern according to religious 
laws.81 Pro-AKP Sabah, in contrast, reported on the same day, “Atheists are in the New 
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Constitution,” and summed up the complicated discussion about religious freedom with 
reference to only one of the settled terms among commission members, the one that 
recognized the right not to believe.82 Relatively more moderate Akşam headlined their 
story “Agreement on the Constitutional Guarantee for Atheists,” but then covered the 
whole debate over freedom of religion and conscience, especially regarding the impasse 
between the AKP and the CHP over the redefinition of secularism.83 
Popular constitution making could have been a significant step toward 
democratization in Turkey, but it also offered a rare opportunity for Turkey’s media, 
however repressed it was at the time, to report on a parliamentary commission that 
purportedly operated on the principle of consensus seeking and not one of deep 
polarization. Civil society organizations that monitored the constitution-making process 
expected this moment to be a “significant turning point” for the media to take on a more 
active role, and overall seemed disappointed with the fact that the press merely 
“reflect[ed] views, rather than endeavoring to provide guidance, contribute to the debate, 
and offer information.”84 Ideally, journalists should of course help people connect the 
dots, offer explanations, and give voice to multiple perspectives. Informative, multi-
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perspectival, and critical media have the potential to expose the public to competing 
interpretations, thereby encouraging citizens to think about the political situation in more 
complex and original ways.85  
Civil society’s expectations of the media, however, may have been unrealistic. 
Not only did they overlook the immense pressure that was looming over Turkey’s media 
industry, but also the fact that journalists, even in more liberal contexts, rarely attempt to 
influence outcomes. Rather, reporters try to protect and advance their careers in line with 
what they imagine to be the ideal role ascribed to them, whether as independent 
watchdogs in a relatively liberal context or as guardians of the unity of the country in a 
more illiberal environment.86 Between 2011 and 2013, the ideal roles Turkey’s media 
took upon themselves were in flux, and there was still some room for negotiation and 
editorial discretion inside newsrooms. The AUK’s initial meetings with members of civil 
society and attempts to control coverage through official statements offered journalists an 
opportunity to practice the profession in a way they had not had much of a chance to do 
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lately, that is, more independently. Most newspapers, in response, managed to cover only 
what was happening (as opposed to providing interpretations and background stories of 
events), give voice to each political party in equal measure, and report on conflicts in a 
balanced manner, albeit for a short period of time. Once the commission’s unity began to 
shatter, journalists’ accounts of the new constitution mirrored the news coverage of other 
subjects: conflicting, not to mention polarizing, stories. 
Toward the end of 2012, media coverage of the AUK started to focus on the 
commission’s timeline, along with a critical interrogation of the durability of the overall 
process as political disagreements persisted. In early November 2012, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan announced that he was losing hope for a new constitution. This not only 
received wide coverage, but also validated negative assessments of the odds of the 
commission’s ultimate success in drafting a new constitution.87 Erdoğan’s statement also 
invited responses from leaders of other political parties, thereby shifting media attention 
from members of the AUK to outsiders. Once the AKP proposed drafting the clauses on 
the executive body in order to constitutionalize a presidential system, both the inner 
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3.3. The AUK Fails as Turkey’s Media Scene Further Deteriorates (January–
December 2013) 
Starting in early 2013, when the AUK’s internal unity continued to disintegrate from 
disagreements and quarrels, the readers of pro-AKP and opposition media were regaled 
with polarizing interpretations of the AUK’s discussions and widely divergent expert 
opinions. One thing, however, united the coverage of the AKP-friendly and opposition 
press: Erdoğan’s pronouncements, which became ever more prominent in the debate on 
the new constitution in early 2013. After he signaled the possibility of a constitutional 
referendum on the work of the AUK, which had already fallen behind schedule in 
completing a draft constitution, Erdoğan published an op-ed in AKP-friendly Sabah in 
February 2013. The title read “A New Constitution for a New Turkey,” and the then-
prime minister reiterated his party’s commitment to a more democratic constitution and 
proclaimed that the AKP would not be “the party that leaves the table.”88 Despite this 
reassurance, word of the AKP’s intention to unilaterally draft a new constitution began to 
spread (see, for example, “Constitution Draft Will Be Rewritten”),89 and the news 
media’s focus soon shifted to openly questioning how much longer the AUK could 
survive, as signaled by headlines such as “Judgment Day for the Constitution,” “The Ball 
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is in the Court of Political Parties,” and “There is No Point in Staying at the Table 
without Progress.”90  
 In the following few months, while the commission’s work slowed down, media 
coverage shifted to a variety of debates spurred by external actors—politicians, party 
leaders, and legal experts—with rare mention of commission members or of Cemil Çiçek. 
Speculation about what would happen if the AUK could not finish drafting the new 
constitution started circulating (“AKP’s Plan B is to ‘settle’ with CHP,” “A Transition 
Constitution is on the Agenda,” “Semi-Presidency with a Mini Package”).91 And even 
when the AUK tried to pick up the pace of its work in May 2013, party representatives 
outside the commission openly expressed their doubts about its future in a manner 
intended to polarize. Media coverage, in line with the political leanings of the various 
newspapers, followed suit. “CHP Wants the Commission to Continue to Derail the New 
Constitution,” headlined the pro-AKP, Gülen-affiliated Zaman in early May in a story 
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about whether or not the AUK would continue its work.92 “AKP Knocks Down the 
Table” announced the opposition paper Cumhuriyet in a story about how the parties were 
blaming each other for the delay in the drafting of the new constitution.93 
 As if the current political climate were not divisive enough, what started as a 
couple dozen activists occupying Istanbul’s Gezi Park in late May 2013 turned into a 
wave of anti-government protests across the country. The Gezi protests became a critical 
moment in pushing Turkey’s media into the spotlight. In its early days, the protests were 
either painted by pro-government media organizations as the work of a Western 
conspiracy or completely ignored by mainstream media. The now widely remembered 
breaking point was when the local CNN affiliate CNN Türk chose to show a documentary 
about penguins at the peak of the protests, while CNN International covered the protests 
as major breaking news from Turkey. The penguin thus became a symbol of media 
cowardice, while dozens of protestors organized sit-ins outside news organizations where 
they chanted “sell-out media,” waved money at the media buildings, and circulated a 
popular hashtag on Twitter (#korkakmedya—“coward media”) to express their 
discontent.94 
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 Many reporters and editors lost their jobs in the wake of Gezi. The Turkish 
Journalists’ Union revealed that 59 journalists were sacked or forced to resign due to their 
coverage of the protests, while some reporters cited much higher numbers.95 NTV Tarih, a 
history magazine owned by NTV, was shut down and its entire staff was fired after the 
magazine prepared to launch a special “Gezi” issue. Even after the protests waned, firings 
of journalists continued. In November 2013, TRT fired two employees who voiced their 
support for Gezi on Twitter.96 In December 2013, leaks of telephone conversations of top 
AKP government officials resulted in a corruption scandal, with the arrests of several 
public officials and businesspeople. The investigations eventually caused the notorious 
fallout between the AKP and the Gülen movement, which was widely believed to have 
instigated the probe. The scandal not only stoked further polarization in media coverage, 
but also revealed the bluntness of the government’s control over the media. In one of the 
wiretapped leaks, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan was heard to order an executive of 
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Habertürk to remove content at the height of the Gezi protests. In response, the editor-in-
chief of Habertürk daily, Fatih Altaylı, acknowledged the intimidation reporters faced 
from government pressure. “The honor of journalism is being trampled on,” he said. 
“Instructions rain down every day from various places. Can you write what you want? 
Everybody is afraid.”97 Between the Gezi Park protests and the December 2013 
corruption scandal, the AUK, for all intents and purposes, collapsed, especially once the 
AKP members—including the chairman, Cemil Çiçek—stopped attending the meetings 
in November 2013.  
 The Gezi protests and corruption allegations not only demonstrated the AKP’s 
heavy-handed control over the press, but also pushed the government, especially then-
Prime Minister Erdoğan, to declare an open war against critical journalism and social 
media. In the run-up to Turkey’s local elections in 2014, he threatened at a rally to “wipe 
out Twitter.” Immediately after his speech, Twitter was blocked for two weeks by a court 
order.98 When the Constitutional Court ruled that the ban on Twitter violated freedom of 
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expression, Erdoğan begrudgingly acknowledged that they had to follow the ruling, but 
he did not respect the Court’s decision. The following year AKP could not win a 
parliamentary majority in the June 2015 general elections, and a two-year-old ceasefire 
between Turkey and the PKK collapsed in July. Amid the intensifying political crisis, the 
censorship of news outlets reached a whole new level. Turkey’s now-defunct 
Telecommunications and Communications Authority (Telekomünikasyon İletişim 
Başkanlığı, TİB) blocked nearly 100 Kurdish websites, most of which were news outlets, 
on the grounds that they were spreading terrorist propaganda.99 The daily Hürriyet faced 
a legal investigation for publishing photos of dead soldiers and an interview with an 
alleged PKK militant. An angry mob attacked the Hürriyet offices a couple of weeks 
later, accusing the paper of misquoting Erdoğan. The heightened nationalist sentiment 
afforded the AKP a clear majority in the snap elections of late 2015, and also enabled 
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 A failed coup attempt and a series of terror attacks in 2016 resulted in a massive 
purge of public employees, members of civil society, and academics accused of having 
connections to terror groups such as Fethullah Gülen’s network and PKK. A total of 131 
media outlets were shut down due to alleged links to the Fethullahist Terrorist 
Organization (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ).100 Instituting a state of emergency for 
two years after the coup attempt, the government was able to rule by decree and shut 
down newspapers, detain or charge critical journalists and media owners, restrict access 
to official meetings, and ban reporting of certain issues by official decree. Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, and other social media services were briefly blocked or throttled on 
multiple occasions.  
It was against this backdrop that Turkey held a referendum in April 2017 on 
several proposed amendments to the 1982 Constitution, most of which granted sweeping 
new powers to the president, thereby changing the country from a parliamentary 
democracy to a hyper-presidential system. In the run-up to the referendum, the “Yes” 
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campaign received disproportionately wide and positive coverage across the media, while 
the “No” campaigners were repeatedly slandered and censored.101 
 In early 2018 one of the major media companies in the country, Doğan Media 
Group, which owned Hürriyet, was sold to the AKP-friendly Demirören Group.102 
According to Erol Önderoğlu, a Turkish representative of Reporters Without Borders, 
this sale ensured that the government would now control “more than 85 percent of 
national mainstream media.”103 While there is still a bit of space for critical voices, these 
few publications are struggling financially and reporting under the routine threat—and 
reality—of prosecution. Turkey has submitted more legal requests to remove content or 
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withhold accounts on Twitter since 2014 than any other country, according to Twitter’s 
annual transparency report.104 The government also passed new laws in 2018 to control 
and curb content on the internet, to which many in the country now turn in order to 
follow critical reporting.105  
 
4. Conclusions 
“Journalists as a species, whether working in democracies or in autocratic states,” 
suggests media sociologist Michael Schudson, “aspire to independent reporting and 
commentary on current affairs.”106 Reporters in Turkey’s illiberal media environment—
predicated upon clientelistic relations, political instrumentalization, and (self-) 
censorship—discovered a short-lived opportunity to enjoy somewhat independent 
reporting and commentary in late 2011 and early 2012, when the AUK embarked on 
writing a new constitution. Ironically, journalists were able briefly to indulge solely in 
documenting facts, covering all sides of a political disagreement, and offering an even-
handed framing of events because the commission, chiefly its chairman Cemil Çiçek, set 
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the ground rules for covering this process firmly from the outset. The limited 
transparency of the commission, along with its controlling attitude toward the press, may 
seem to contradict the original spirit of the AUK, which intended to be democratic and 
inclusive. Yet the commission’s attempt to police the boundaries of journalistic work by 
putting together a media advisory council, routinely convening with editors and reporters, 
and sufficiently supplying the media with enough narratives about the terms of the debate 
inside the AUK enabled Turkey’s mainstream media to offer the basic form of 
accountability in democratic politics: reporting on facts in a straightforward and balanced 
manner. 
The significance of the AUK’s check on media coverage became clearer when the 
narrative of popular constitution making drastically changed between the end of 2012 and 
November 2013, when the commission was effectively dissolved. The partisan 
fragmentation of the media landscape, along with increasing government pressure, 
resulted in highly polarizing and, in some cases, conflicting news stories about the 
constitutional debates. As more political voices outside of the AUK, especially top party 
officials and then-Prime Minister Erdoğan, began to comment on specific articles, the 
coverage became more divisive, and complex debates were reduced to ideologically 
driven sound bites. In more independent media environments, when government officials 
are less unified in their views on public issues, journalists use these disagreements to 
offer a variety of differentiated opinions and analyses of political decision-making 
processes. Yet in Turkey’s illiberal media environment, which markedly deteriorated 
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from 2013 onward, the inter-elite conflict over the new constitution greatly limited the 
work of journalists, who had to walk a very careful line as the AKP government’s 
practices reached new levels of authoritarianism around the same time. 
This analysis of Turkey’s attempt at popular constitution making and the media’s 
limited role in the process calls into question the inherent normative value of some of the 
deeply held assumptions about liberal democratic processes, transparency, the media, and 
publicity. First, as the AUK’s control over the media narrative at the beginning of the 
constitution making indicates, limited transparency may lead to more informative and fair 
coverage of political discussions. Second, more voices in public debates do not 
automatically translate into multi-perspectival news coverage, especially when reporters 
operate in an illiberal, polarizing media environment. Third, attempts to include citizen 
feedback and civil society input in political processes, especially via media publicity, risk 
disintegrating into a series of opposing monologues motivated by different political 
agendas instead of generating a popular dialogue and a back-and-forth negotiation of 
competing ideas. Rather than rejecting the value of transparency, diversity, or 
participation in popular constitution making as mediated by journalism, Turkey’s case 
underscores that, without the backing of formal, independent institutions and the rule of 
law, these ideals are not infallibly a democratizing influence. As Walter Lippman 
famously asserted, “The press is no substitute for institutions.”107  
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